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Abstract: In this paper, I propose to interpret the history of stability analysis of
a Walrasian exchange economy through the lenses of the concept of substitutability.
A purely mathematical approach of this story does not seem sufficient to account
for the way economists have studied the question of stability and how thay have
reacted to the results of this research programme. My point is that mathematical
constraints kept apart, the concept of substituability has shaped the path followed
by stability analysis since the publication of Value and Capital (Hicks, 1939) up to
the Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu theorems and beyond.
Thus, I uphold that firstly, the concept of substitutability allows to catch the
heuristic behind the work on stability, and secondly, it allows replacing the impor-
tance of SMD results in a broader context, giving a more subtle view of the ups and
down of general equilibrium theory as a research program.
Key words: stability, general equilibrium, gross substitutability, substitutabil-
ity, complementarity, Hicks (John Richard), law of demand, Sonnenschein-Mantel-
Debreu, methodology.
JEL: B21, B23, B41, C62
1 The heuristic value of the substitutability assump-
tion
It is common view that the aims of general equilibrium theory have been seriously
disrupted and reoriented after the famous Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu theorems.
The hopes for finding general sufficient conditions under which a tâtonnement pro-
cess is stable for a competitive economy have turned into dark pessimism, and even
to disinterest.
The story of the stability issue as a specific research program within GET is
rather well known. Ingrao and Israel (1990) have identified the steps and boundaries
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(see also Kirman (2006)). Some scholars have dealt more specifically with the issue
of dynamics, establishing connections with the history of general equilibrium theory
(Weintraub (1985), Weintraub (1991), Hands (1994)).
In contrast, the methodological appraisal of this story has not been pushed very
far. Hands (2010 and 2016) provides insights regarding the notion of stability of
consumer’s choice and revealed preference theory in relation with the stability of
general equilibrium, but his aim is not to provide a comprehensive analysis of the
stability issue. Hence, as a shortcut to the history of stability, the most common
opinion on the subject (Guerrien, 1989; Rizvi, 1997; Bliss, 1994) credits the famous
Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu theorems for having discarded any serious reference to
the invisible hand mechanism to reach a competitive market equilibrium. However,
one can find a slightly different position regarding the stability literature in Ingrao
and Israel (1990). According to them, from the very beginning of the 1960s, math-
ematical knowledge on dynamical systems and some well known instability results
(Scarf, 1960; Gale, 1963) made stability researches already a vain task.
The gap between those two positions is not anecdotal. Firstly, according to the
stance adopted, the place of the SMD results is not the same, both theoretically and
from a symbolic point of view. Secondly, there are methodological consequences at
stake on the way we can represent the development of general equilibrium theory,
and more specifically, on the kind of methodological principles at work in a field of
research characterized first of all by strong mathematical standards.
The aim of this paper is to identify some methodological principles at stake in
the history of the stability of a competitive general equilibrium. More precisely, I
would like to identify some criteria, other than mere analytical rigor, that were in
use to direct research strategies and to evaluate and interpret theorems obtained in
this field. This methodological look at the stability literature may lead to a more
progressive view of the history, where results are modifying step by step the feelings
of mathematical economists on the successes and failures of a research program.
My aim in this article is to provide a first step into the history of stability of a
Walrasian exchange economy, taking Hicks’s Value and capital (1939) as a starting
point. To this end, I will put in the foreground the concept of substitutability.
Indeed, substitutability has been a structuring concept for thinking about stability.
It is my contention here that the concept of substitutability helps to provide some
methodological thickness to the history of general equilibrium theory, not captured
by purely mathematical considerations. Hence, I uphold that it allows identifying
some methodological and heuristic constraints that were framing the interpretation
of the successes and failures in this field.
It is well known that a sufficient condition for local and global stability of the
Walrasian tâtonnement in a pure exchange economy is the gross-substitutability
assumption (GS) (i.e., that all market excess demands increase when the price of
other goods increases). By reconstructing the history of stability analysis through
the concept of substitutability, I uphold that the representations attached to sub-
stitutability constituted a positive heuristic for the research program on stability.
Therefore, tracking the ups and downs of this concept within general equilibrium
provides some clues to appraise the methodology of general equilibrium in histori-
cal perspective and to account for the rise and fall of stability analysis in general
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equilibrium theory.
The research progam on stability of a competitive general equilibrium is by itself
rather specific within GET, and bears on other subfields of GET such as unique-
ness and comparative statics. It is also grounded on some views about the meaning
of the price adjustment process. Stability theorems are for the most part of them
not systematically microfounded: they are formulated at first as properties on the
aggregate excess demands (such as gross substitutability, diagonal dominance, weak
axiom of revealed preference), and their theoretical value is then assessed against
their descriptive likelyhood and heuristic potential, and not against their compati-
bility with the most general hypotheses of individual rationality. The paper upholds
that the concept of substitutability, as a tool for expressing market interdependen-
cies, was seen as a common language to mathematical economists, rich enough to
develop a research program on stability and to appraise its progress and failures.
An ever recurring question behind different narratives on GET revolves around
the principles explaining the logic of its development, the fundamental reasons that
explain GET was a developing area of research in the 1950s-1960s while it became
depreciated in the 1970s. Adopting a Lakatosian perspective, one would say that the
research program on GET was progressive in the 1960s and became regressive in the
1970s. Even this question assumes that we (methodologists, theorists, historians)
agree upon the idea that GET is functioning as a research program and that it went
trough two different periods, one during which new knowledge accumulated and one
that made new “positive” results hopeless, even devaluating older results in view of
new ones.
Recent trends in economic methodology have left behind the search for such
normative and comprehensive systems of interpretation of the developments of eco-
nomic theories. They focus instead on economics as a complex or intricate system of
theories, models, fields of research, each (potentially) using a variety of methods as
rationalizing and exploratory tools (econometrics and statistical methods applied to
various data, simulations, experiments). The first goal of methodological inquiries is
then to bring some order into the ways those various tools and methods are applied
in practice, how they are connected (or not) through specific discourses, what are
the rationales of the practitioners themselves when they apply them.
As far as we are concerned here, the question lends itself how GET can be grasped
as an object of inquiry in itself, and more precisely how a field of questionings and
research within this field—the stability of a competitive system—can be analyzed
both as an autonomous field and in connection with other parts of GET. The present
contribution does not claim to provide the structuring principle that explains the
ups and downs of the researches on the stability of general competitive equilibrium.
It is too evident that various aspects of this research are connected with what is
taking place in other parts of the field. First, the kind of mathematical object which
is likely to serve as a support for discussing about stability is not independent of
the choice of the price-adjustment process that is used to describe the dynamics of
the system when it is out-of-equilibrium. Hence, the explanatory power of a set of
assumptions (about demand properties) is not disconnected from the explanatory
power of another set of assumptions (the price adjustment process), which himself
has to be connected with the assumptions about agents behavior, motivations and
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perception of their institutional environment (e.g. price taking behaviors, utility
maximizing and profit maximizing assumptions). In a sense, while it is useful to
analyze the proper historical path of researches on the stability of a Walrasian tâ-
tonnement with a methodological questioning in mind, the historian-methodologist
should be aware that various rationales are likely to play a role in its valuation as a
relevant or anecdotal result. Second, the kind of assumptions made on a system of
interdependent markets will have simultaneous consequences on different subfields
of GET. An all too obvious example is that Gross Substitutability is both sufficient
for uniqueness and global stability of a competitive equilibrium and allows for some
comparative statics theorems. Third, the simple fact of identifying an autonomous
subfield of research and to claim that it is stable enough through time to be analyzed
independently of some internal issues that surface here and there, is something that
needs questioning. I have in mind the fact that it is not something quite justified
to take the stability of a competitive equilibrium as a historically stable object on
which we may apply confidently various methodological hypotheses. There is first
the question of delimiting the kind of tools used to describe such a competitive
process. Certainly the Walrasian Tâtonnement (WT) has been acclaimed as the
main tool for this, but the methodological rationale for it needs be considered in
detail to account for the way theorists interpret the theorems of stability. One set
of question could be: What about similar theorems when non-tâtonnement pro-
cesses are considered? Why discard processes with exchanges out of equilibrium?
Another set would be: Why not considering that the auctioneer takes into account
some interdependencies on the market to calculate new prices? Should we search
for stability theorems that are independent of the speed of adjustment on markets?
Should stability be independent of the choice of the numéraire?
It is my contention here that the methodology of economics cannot hope to find
out one regulatory principle adapted for describing and rationalizing the evolutions
of a field of research when the studied object is by itself under a set various forces
from inside and outside that make it rather unstable. If I do not claim for an ex-
planatory principle of the research on stability theorems, what does this historical
piece of research pretend to add to existing litterature? It provides a principle that
is in tune with most recent research on the methodology of GET, as exemplified in
Hands (2016). It argues that the mathematical economists involved in the search for
stability theorems adopted a strategy that focused on the ability to provide an inter-
pretative content to their theorems, which by itself was necessary to formulate ways
of improvement and generalization. In this respect, the concept of substitutability
offered a way to connect the properties of individual behaviors with system-wide
assumptions (such as GS) and to appraise those assumptions as more or less satis-
factory or promising, in consideration of the kind of interpretable modifications that
can be elaborated upon, using the language of substitutability. In so doing, using
economically interpretable and comparable sets of assumptions is presented as a cri-
teria for valuating theorems, confronting them and fostering new research strategies;
while at the same time it does not pretend to exhaust the reasons for interpreting
those results with respect to the developments in other fields of GET. Even if the
language of substitutability would lead to some new results (in the 1970s-1990s),
their valuation would become too weak in comparison with what was expected as a
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satisfactory assumption after the critical results obtained by Sonnenschein, Mantel
and Debreu. The paper aims at putting some historical perspective on how the
concept of substitutability failed to convey enough economically interpretable and
fruitful content.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 deals with Hicks’ Value and capital
(1939) and its subsequent influence on stability issues until the middle of the 1950s.
During this time span, stability is linked intimately with the search for compara-
tive static results. It is a founding time for the heuristic of substitutability, and
more precisely for the idea of a relation between substitutability and stability. (2.
Stability and Substitutability: A Hicksian Tradition). With the axiomatic turn of
GET, there are hopes for finding relevant conditions of stability. On the one hand,
substitutability remains a good guiding principle, while on the other hand, the first
examples of instability are presented, making findings of reasonable conditions of
stability more urgent. (3. From Gross Substitutability to instability examples).
The last time period in this story is much more uneasy and agitated. It is char-
acterised with hidden pessimism and with difficulties in making substitutability a
fruitful concept for stability theorems. One among other results, the SMD theorems
come as a confirmation that the search for stability of the Walrasian tâtonnement
is a dead-end. But as we will see, it is not the only result that played a role in the
neglect of stability analysis (4. The end of a research program). As a conclusion,
I provide an evaluation of the SMD results and of their consequences within the
context of many other results (5. Concluding comments).
2 Stability and substitutability: a Hicksian tradi-
tion
In Value and Capital (1939), Hicks makes a systematic use of substitutes and com-
plements to express stability conditions. He upholds a narrow link between stability
and substitutability, giving to the concept of substitutability an explanatory value
of the stability of market systems and praising its qualities to describe the main
features of market interdependencies. This view would imprint the future of the
search for stability conditions. I will first present Hicks’ ideas on stability and sub-
stitutability (2.1 Stability and substitutability according to Hicks). Then, I show
how a Hicksian tradition in GET was established in the 1940s and 1950s (2.2 A
Hicksian tradition).
2.1 Stability and substitutability according to Hicks
Let’s remind first some technical definitions. In Value and Capital, Hicks provides a
definition of substitutes and complements on the basis of the Slutsky (1915) funda-
mental equation of value. The Hicks-Slutsky decomposition of the derivative of the
demand for good i, xi with respect to the price of a good j, pj is:
∂xi(p, r)
∂pj
=
∂hi(p, u)
∂pj
− xj ∂xi(p, r)
∂r
(1)
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with r the income of an agent, xi(p, r) the Marshallian demand for i, hi(p, u) the
compensated demand (or Hicksian demand) for i where u is the (indirect) level of
utility attainable with (p, r), noted v(p, r).
From (1) we say that i and j are net substitutes, independent or net complements
if the change in the compensated demand of i due to a change in pj is positive, null,
or negative:
∂hi(p, v(p, r))
∂pj
T 0 (2)
From the equation (1) we say that i and j are gross substitutes, independent or
gross complements if the change in the Marshallian demand of i due to a change in
pj verifies
∂xi(p, r)
∂pj
T 0 (3)
At an aggregated level, definitions (2) and (3) are usable for a general description
of substitution between different markets, and equation (1) can serve to discuss the
direction and the strength of revenue effects.
As can be infered from (1), two goods may be localy net substitutes (resp. net
complements) and gross complements (resp. gross substitutes) depending on the
direction and magnitude of income effects in the Slutsky-Hicks decomposition. What
is true at the individual level is alo true at the aggregate. Hence, as is well known,
the symmetry property of Hicksian demand functions ∂hi(p,r)
∂pj
=
∂hj(p,r)
∂pi
is not true
for Marshallian demands, except of course when income effects can be neglected.
In 1874, Walras had launched the idea of a sequential and iterative process
—a tâtonnement—to model the price dynamics on competitive markets and to
establish the possibility for such idealized markets to "discover" by groping the
equilibrium—whose existence was theoretically assumed by the equality of equa-
tions and unknowns in the model. Walras would also connect the tâtonnement with
some comparative static results.1
In Value and Capital, Hicks reinstates Walrasian general equilibrium analysis,
which had been deemed fruitless by Marshall.2 This renewal of interest for general
equilibrium, it is worth noting, arises precisely from the availability of new tools to
analyze choice and demand, notably the Slutsky equation, hence also the distinction
between income and substitution effects and the new definition of substitutes and
complements build from it.3
1Walras (1874), after discussing the tâtonnement when the price vector is not at equilibrium,
applies the same technic to discussing the effects of a simple change in the parameters of the model,
e.g. a change in the intial endowment in one good to one agent. The whole set of results—a mix of
stability and comparative statics—is precisely what Walras calls the "Law of supply and demand"
2Actually, the mathematical analysis of stability was already published in 1937 in the booklet
presenting the appendix of Value and capital, Théorie mathématique de la valeur en régime de libre
concurrence (Hicks, 1937).
3Hicks and Allen (1934) provided the state of the art of the ordinalist theory of choice and
demand, obtaining independently of Slutsky (1915) a decomposition of the single price effect on
demand into two effects (Chipman and Lenfant, 2002). They also corrected Pareto’s insuficiencies
(Pareto, 1971) as regards the defition of complements and substitutes, which implied to recognize
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In Hicks’s view, even more certainly than for Walras, there is no doubt that the
law of supply and demand leads the economy to an equilibrium. Hicks will follow
Walras’s reasoning on stability, with the aim of providing a precise mathematical
account for it and to discuss with much more attention the effect of interdependen-
cies between markets. Since the first part of the analysis proceeds in an exchange
economy, the Slutsky equation then becomes:
∂zi(p, r)
∂pj
=
∂hi(p, u)
∂pj
− zj ∂xi(p, r)
∂r
(4)
This leads to the well-known distinction between perfect and imperfect stability
and its mathematical treatment in the Appendix of Value and capital. Consider
the Jacobian matrix of the normalized system of n goods, that is, the matrix JZ
containing all the cross derivatives of excess demand functions relative to all prices
[zij(p
?)], i, j ∈ [1, ...n] (the price of good n + 1 being set equal to 1). Stability will
be perfect if the principal minors of JZ, calculated at equilibrium p?, alternate in
sign, the first one being negative. The system is imperfectly stable if only the last
of these determinants respects the sign condition.
Hicks’s analysis proceeds from the generalization of the results obtained in a
two-good economy. He thinks that, except for particular cases, income effects to
buyers and sellers on each market should tend to compensate each others:
Therefore, when dealing with problems of the stability of exchange, it
is a reasonable method of approach to begin by assuming that income
effects do cancel out, and then to inquire what difference it makes if
there is a net income effect in one direction or the other. (Hicks, 1939,
64-65)
Thus, actually, through this thought experiment, the Jacobian of the system
is identical to the matrix of substitution effects (the Slutsky matrix) since income
effects on each market—i.e. associated to each price variation—are assumed to
cancel out. And after a rather clumsy discussion about introducing income effects
in the reasoning, Hicks comes to the following conclusion:
To sum up the negative but reassuring conclusions which we have derived
from our discussion of stability. There is no doubt that the existence
of stable systems of multiple exchange is entirely consistent with the
laws of demand. It cannot, indeed, be proved a priori that a system of
multiple exchange is necessarily stable. But the conditions of stability
are quite easy conditions, so that it is quite reasonable to assume that
they will be satisfied in almost any system with which we are likely to
be concerned. The only possible ultimate source of instability is strong
asymmetry in the income effects. A moderate degree of substitutability
among the bulk of commodities will be sufficient to prevent this cause
being effective. (Hicks, 1939, 72-73, emphasis mine)
them as a relationship between two goods as regards a third one (or money). Slutsky (1915) did not
provide a new definition, which, he suggested, would have been disconnected from human feelings
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What kind of substitutability is refereed to here? That the goods are net substi-
tutes to one another. Consequently, the argument goes, symmetrical revenue effects
at the aggregate level will have only a weak effect compared with the aggregate
substitution effect, so that the Jacobian matrix is approximately symmetric. In so
doing, Hicks develops a descriptive and explicative point of view on stability, and
substitutability is given a prominent role. Substitutability is entrusted to produce a
stylised representation of the interdependencies between markets, likely to receive a
validation a priori. Thus, the idea that substitutes are dominating over the system
is regarded as a natural and virtuous property of the economic system.
In the wake of Samuelson’s discarding of Hicks’ mathematical treatment of sta-
bility, there has been a tendency to evaluate Hick’s analysis of stability exclusively
from the standpoint of the mathematical apparatus of Value and capital, i.e. from
the perfect/imperfect stability distinction, with a view of pinpointing its wrong
mathematical conclusions. Instead, to our story, it is worth insisting that Hicks’
reasoning in the text provides insights about the importance of substitutability as
a structuring device. The heart of Hicks’ reasoning, actually, is a discussion of
interdependencies in a three-good case.
The gist of the discursive argument about stability of multiple markets in Value
and Capital is in Chapter V, §§4-5, after Hick’s introduction of the distinction be-
tween perfect and imperfect stability. It is to be noted also that the perfect/imperfect
stability distinction is aimed at being powerful to consider cases of intertemporal
non clearing Keynesian equilibria.
Here, the main question is whether an intrinsically stable market (say of good
X) can be made unstable through reactions of price adjustments on other markets
(themselves being out of equilibrium following the initial variation of the price px
and the subsequent reallocations of budgets). The interactions between markets
for X and Y (T being the third composite commodity) are first studied under the
assumption that net income effects can be neglected. Hicks discusses the case of
price elasticities of excess demand for Y on the excess demand for X and T . He
ends with the reassuring idea that in the three-good case, and even more when the
number of goods widens, cases of strong complementarity are seldom and X will
most of the time be “mildly substitutable” with most of the goods constitutive of
the composite commodity T . 4
Hence, the whole discussion of the mathematical apparatus is conducted through
the idea of neglecting asymmetric income effects, focusing on complementarity rela-
tions to deal with instability and on a reasonable spread of substitutability to ensure
stability. This latter argument would be corrected in the second edition of Value
and Capital. Our point, here, is that from a heuristic or interpretative standpoint,
Hicks’ overall discussion is biased not specifically by its mathematical treatment,
which is constrained by focusing on symmetrical systems; it is also biased by the
strong separation between discussion of net complementarity and substitution on
the one side and discussion of income effects on the other side. Hicks’ discursive
4If the the market for X is unstable taken by itself, price reactions will tend to increase market
disequilibrium, hence it will not be made stable through reactions with other markets (Hicks (1939),
71-72, §5). Again, this result would probably be different if a number of market interactions are
taken into account.
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focus on complementarity has two opposite effects. First, it introduces the language
of substitutability as the prominent device to discuss stability issues (as will be the
case again when discussing intertemporal equilibrium). Second, it isolates the anal-
ysis of substitutability from the one on income effects, thus introducing a strong
separation between arguments in terms of income effects and arguments in terms of
substitutability to deal with stability analysis.
2.2 The establishment of a Hicksian tradition on stability
analysis
Hicks’s analysis of system stability was first challenged by Samuelson (1941; 1942;
1944)5, who rejected his method and results. Samuelson’s criticism was the starting
point for a series of restatements of Hicks’ intuitions by Lange (1944; 1940), Mosak
(1944), Smithies (1942) and Metzler (1945). Hicks’s views and intuitions were par-
tially saved, pointing out its usefulness to think about stability issues. This led
to establishing the language of substitutability as a heuristically fruitful concept to
think about stability of general equilibrium. However, Hicks’ narrow view which
concentrated on net substitutability was abandoned and the analysis would now be
conducted in terms of gross-substitutes and complements
According to Samuelson, Hicksian stability is a static approach to stability. It
consists mainly “to generalize to any number of markets the stability conditions of
a single market” (Samuelson, 1947, 270). Instead, Samuelson (1941) proposes the
first true dynamic expression of Walrasian tâtonnement as a simultaneous process
of price adjustment on markets. It takes the form of a differential equation system,
p˙i = H(zi(p), H being a monotonic positive function (actually, Samuelson considers
the simple case p˙i = zi(p)). Such a system is stable if and only if real parts of the
eigenvalues associated to the Jacobian [Zij] of the system are all negative.
More precisely, Samuelson introduces a distinction between local stability and
global stability of an equilibrium price vector p?. The former obtains when applying
the differential equation to a system of demand functions starting from the neighbor-
hood of p? tends to p?. Global stability obtains if the price path tends to p? starting
from any initial positive price vector. In the local stability case, the Jacobian can be
approximated by linearization around p? and the tâtonnement process will be stable
if and only if the real part of all the characteristic roots of the matrix are strictly
negative. Samuelson would show that the conditions of Hicksian perfect stability
are neither necessary (Samuelson, 1941) nor sufficient (Samuelson, 1944) for local
linear stability (the same, a fortiori, for Hicksian imperfect stability). Hence, to
Samuelson, Hicksian matrices (ie matrices with principal minors alternating in sign,
starting with a negative sign) are not a sound starting point for thinking about
stability. The main lesson to be drawn from Samuelson’s analysis is that taking
the income effect seriously is indispensable to making a serious analysis of stability.
However, one weakness of Samuelson’s analysis of stability is that he does not strive
to provide interpretable conditions of stability. In the time period following immedi-
ately Samuelson’s reformulation of stability conditions, Metzler, Lange, Mosak and
5see also Samuelson (1947) which contains in substance the three articles mentioned
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Smithies would rework the Hicksian intuition in line with Samuelson’s mathematical
apparatus.
Smithies (1942), apparently independently of Samuelson, discussed the case of
stability of a monopolistic price competition economy and arrived at different nec-
essary and sufficient properties of the roots of the characteristic polynomial of his
system, (which, by the way, followed a sequential process of adjustment): those
roots should be less than unity in absolute value. Interestingly, he noted that the
advantage of his method over Samuelson’s is that his result "leads more readily to
general economic interpretation than Mr. Samuelson’s method" (Smithies, 1942,
266)
As for Mosak, Lange and Metzler, their investigations on the stability of economic
equilibrium circa 1942-1945 can be interpreted as a series of work aiming at devel-
opping a Hicksian method in the analysis of Keynesian economic ideas, focussing
on the general equilibrium framework and promoting the idea that unemployment
can result from intertemporal durable underemployment of some ressources. Those
various contributions will deal with international trade, imperfect competition, mon-
etary theory and financial behaviors to build on Hicks’s intuitions. Passages dealing
with the stability of general static equilibrium are occasions to adapt Hick’s results
to the modern treatment of the price adjustment process provided by Samuelson.
Lange’s (1944) Price Flexibility and Employment is probably the most represen-
tative account of those various attempts. He had already identified that the theory
of complementarity would be a debated topic (Lange, 1940). The main point here
is that the interplay of markets depends partly on individual’s behaviors towards
money. Indeed, Lange (1940) provided a systematic analysis of complementarity
relationships at the market level. He refrains from Hicks’s tendency to identifiy
complementarity as a possible cause of instability. Lange also introduces a notion
of partial stability of order m, expressing the fact that a system can be stable for
a given subset of m prices that are adjusted (m < n). He discusses Hick’s dynamic
stability conditions and notes that since Samuelson leaves out the derivative of the
function H in the characteristic determinant, it is tantamount to assuming that the
flexibility of all prices is the same. He highlights that Hicksian stability makes sense
in case when the Jacobian (the characteristic determinant) is symmetric: then, all
roots are real, and the Hicksian conditions are necessary and sufficient for perfect
stability.6. The meaning of symmetry, he goes on, is that "the marginal effect of
a change in the price ps upon the speed of adjustment of the price pr equals the
marginal effect of a change in the price pr upon the speed of adjustment of the price
ps" (Lange, 1944, 98). Thus, stability analysis does not require an equal speed of
adjustment on each market, but that the effects of a price change (dpr) upon the
speed of adjustment on another market dps
dt
are symmetric.
Mosak’s exposition of the theory of stability of the equilibrium in General-
Equilibrium Theory in International Trade also discusses the flaws of Hick’s stability
analysis. Its main merit, in this respect, is to operate a shift in the interpretation
of stability. Instead of focusing on the symmetry properties of the Jacobian, the
analysis of stability now revolves around the properties of excess demands, which
6Symmetry of the characteristic determinant of order m implies (and requires) symmetry of all
its principal minors
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can be conducted either in terms of gross-substitutability vs gross-complementarity
or in terms of asymmetrical vs symmetrical income effects.7 ... If the rate of change
of consumption with respect to income is the same for all individuals then this net
income effect will be zero. In order that the net income effect should be at all large,
∂xs
∂r
must be considerably different for buyers of xs from what it is for sellers. it is
not too unreasonable to assume therefore that ordinarily the income effects will not
be so large as to render the system unstable" (Mosak, 1944, p.42).
Mosak would also mention the assumption that usually, goods that are net sub-
stititutes are also gross-substitutes (Mosak, 1944, p.45).
Metzler (1945) established that under gross substitutability (GS), the condi-
tions of Hicksian stability are the same as the conditions for true dynamic stability.
Metzler insists that Hicks’s analysis of stability aims at giving some ground to com-
parative statics results by providing a theory of price dynamics when a system is
out of equilibrium. The conclusion that lends itself from Samuelson’s results is that
"Hicksian stability is only remotely connected with true dynamic stability" (Met-
zler, 1945, 279). However, Metzler’s argues, "the Hicks conditions are highly useful
despite their lack of generality"(Metzler, 1945, 279):
In the first place ... Hicks conditions of perfect stability are necessary
if stability is to be independent of . . . price responsivness. Second, and
more important, in a certain class of market systems Hicksian perfect
stability is both necessary and sufficient for true dynamic stability. In
particular, if all commodities are gross substitutes, the conditions of
true dynamic stability are identical with the Hicks condition of perfect
stability. (Metzler, 1945, 279-280).
The idea to take into account speeds of adjustement on each market is con-
genial to Samuelson’s dynamic stability conditions and was further identified as a
defect of Hicks’ analysis by Lange (1944). This point is quite interesting since it
illustrates how some properties of a mathematical tool can be entrusted with im-
portant descriptive qualities. Clearly, imposing that a price-adjustment should not
be independent of the speed of adjustment may be taken as a gain in generality in
some sense, but to some clearly it was not and it would appear as an unnecessary
constraint.8
Given that the knowledge of speeds of adjustement is likely to be dependent
upon specific institutional properties of an economic system, it is desirable to for-
mulate stability conditions in terms that are independent of such speeds. For all
that, the fact that Hicks conditions of perfect stability are necessary in his case
does not make them sufficient for stability. At least, when the assumption of gross
7Stability can be destroyed only if the market income effects are sufficiently large to overcome
the relationships which prevail between the substitution terms. It cannot be destroyed by any
possible degree of complementarity.
8Smithies (1942) analyses the stability of a monopolistic competitive framework. Starting from
profit maximization conditions of n producers with their own market demand expectations. Each
producer will change its price according to a continuous adjustment process proposed by Lange
(1935) taking into account the difference between the last period price expectation and the price
of the last period.
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substitutability is made, Hicksian stability is necessary and sufficient for true dy-
namic stability. Metzler agrees that this property may not be useful since "almost
all markets have some degree of complementarity" (Metzler, 1945, 291). Hence ig-
noring gross complementarity in the system can lead to "serious errors" (Metzler,
1945, 284). However, Metzler’s feeling is in tune with other researchers interested in
stability analysis, and it is upholding the interest of Hicks fundamental intuitions:
It is natural to speculate about the usefulness of these conditions for
other classes of markets as well. The analysis presented above does not
preclude the possibility that the Hicks conditions may be identical with
the true dynamic conditions for certain classes of markets in which some
goods are complementary. Indeed, Samuelson has previously demon-
strated one such case [Samuelson, 1941, 111]; ... Further investigation
may reveal other cases of a similar nature. In any event, an investigation
which relates the true stability conditions to the minors of the static sys-
tem will be highly useful, whether or not the final results are in accord
with the Hicks conditions. (Metzler, 1945, 292)
In a few words, the main contribution of the Metzler analysis (together with those
mentioned above) is to introduce once more the concept of substitutability into the
analysis of stability, and to focus on the interpretative content of the analysis. The
Hicksian tradition is reformulated around the gross substitutability hypothesis. And
this hypothesis is taken as a fruitful point of departure.
To make a conclusion on this first group of works on stability, one can say that
the concept of substitutability has been worked out in the 1930s and 1940s so that it
can be used to describe and to interpret the main stability properties of an economic
system. So, beyond the mathematics of stability, there is an interpretative content
and a “positive heuristic” attached to substitutability. It is enhanced first by the
idea that substitutes are good for stability (Hicks), and then, following Samuelson’s
criticism, that income effects should not be so ditributed as to disturb the stabi-
lizing properties of symmetric systems, which implies in turn to consider that net
substitution will dominate over income effects. Hence, even if a theory of aggregate
income effects is needed, most of the arguments and the dynamic of research will
take gross-substitutability as the starting point for further results.
It was so much shared by the researcher involved in GET at the time that
Newman could write more than a decade later:
A good deal of the work on the analysis of stability has been directed to-
wards establishing intuitively reasonable–or at least readily comprehensible—
conditions on the elements of A, that will ensure stability. (Newman,
1959, 3)
Research in this direction was on the tracks since the beginning of the 1950s.
it was notably explored by Morishima (1952) by formulating a stability theorem
when some complementarity is introduced into the modeL A Morishima is charac-
terized by a complementarity-substitutability chain hypothesis, (CS): Substitutes of
substitutes (and complements of complements) are substitutes, and substitutes of
complements (and complements of substitutes) are complements.
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Morishima derives a number of theorems from such a system, notably that dy-
namic stability conditions are equivalent to the Hicksian conditions for perfect sta-
bility. This result, in turn, was important for establishing the interest of Hicksian
stability conditions despite Samuelson’s criticism. However, Morishima’s analysis
introduced new unexpected constraints regarding the choice of a numéraire and
would lead to further comments in the next decades.
Now, by the end of the 1950s, the idea that stability should be analyzed through
the properties of the matrix representing the derivatives of excess demand functions
relatively to prices was well established. Moreover, research focused on systems
implying gross substitutability or on systems whose content could be described as
properties of the [zij] involving substitutability. The existence and optimality the-
orems of the 1950s put stability issues in the background for a few years, only to
surface in the end of the 1950s in a more serious form. Now, the question is: What
will be left of this analysis of stability after the axiomatic turn in general equilibrium
theory, once the issue of global stability will become central?
3 From “gross-substitutability” to instability exam-
ples (1958-1963)
The turn of the 1960s represents the heyday of the research on the stability of a
system of interdependent markets connected through a simple dynamics of price
adjustments, the Walrasian tâtonnement. At this moment in time, the use of the
langage of substitutablity is structuring research towards theorems of stability. Mor-
ishima even proclaimed that "Professor Hicks is the pioneer who prepared the way
to a new economic territory—a system in which all goods are gross substitutes for
each other" (Morishima, 1960, 195). Indeed, work on stability of general equilibrium
was rather limited in the 1950s, researchers being more focussed on existence and
welfare theorems, and there was a sudden boom by the very end of the 1950s. The
time span between 1958 and 1963 is fundamental both for the structuring of the
research on stability and the importance of the language of subtitutability as the
main interpretative device to think about stability.
In this section, I would like to put to the foreground the mode of development of
general equilibrium analysis after Arrow-Debreu-McKenzie theorems of existence. I
will begin by enhancing the intuitive privilege that was attributed to the stability
hypothesis, and as a consequence, the interest for the gross-substitutability assump-
tion (2.1. “Gross substitutability” as a reference assumption). Then, I will focus on
instability examples and the way the results have been received by theoreticians (2.2
Scarf and Gale’s counter-examples). The discussion of alternative sufficient condi-
tions of stability are then discussed (2.3 Gross Substitutability, Diagonal Dominance
and WARP)
3.1 “Gross substitutability” as a reference assumption
Most of the work on stability in the fifties and sixties is centered on the hypothe-
sis of gross substitutability. It is a sufficient hypothesis for unicity of equilibrium
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(Arrow and Hurwicz, 1958). It is also the hypothesis with which Arrow, Block and
Hurwicz established the global stability of the tâtonnement in 1959. This result was
presented as a confirmation of the importance for stability of the substitution among
goods. Let’s make a short digression on the status of concept and hypothesis within
the axiomatic phase of general equilibrium theory. Axiomatisation is usually at odds
with the interpretative content of the concepts and hypothesis (Debreu, 1986; Ingrao
and Israel, 1990). The question is thus whether the heuristic properties of substi-
tutability should remain relevant in this context. The answer is yes. Leaving aside
the relevance of the tâtonnement as a descriptive tool, the fact is that most of the
theoreticians, I mean those who were interested in the work on stability, tended to
consider that the concepts and assumptions used should have some heuristic prop-
erties and descriptive qualities. This aspect of the work on stability, compared with
other fields of general equilibrium theory, is hardly underlined (Hands, 2016). In
any case, it is certainly a key to study the development of stability analysis and
to understand the reactions of the main protagonists. Otherwise stated, everything
happens as if the descriptive content of general equilibrium was not only at the level
of the dynamic process but also at the level of the properties of the excess demand
functions giving stability. In this sense, substitutability plays a heuristic role in the
stability analysis, in conformity with Hicks’s ideas. It is also to be mentioned that
some theoreticians have always privileged a use of axiomatics bounded by the con-
straints of providing interpretable theorems. This is exemplified in Arrow and Hahn
(1971) and it can be traced back to Abraham Wald (1936). The assumption of gross-
substitutability, as such, could appear to any economist with a solid background in
mathematics as the most natural assumption to obtain global or local stability of the
price adjustment process. Indeed, GS appears in many studies on dynamic stability
in the late 1950s. Let’s mention Hahn (1958), Negishi (1958), McKenzie (1960),
Arrow and Hurwicz (1960), and the now classical Arrow and Hurwicz (1958) and
Arrow, Block and Hurwicz (1959) articles.9 Arrow and Hurwicz (1958) testifies for
the optimist flavor of the time. Under GS, homogeneity of demand functions and
the Walras Law, they show that the tâtonnement process is globally stable. The
proof makes use of Lyapunov’s second method to study dynamical systems. In this
article, they show that certain kinds of complementarity relations are logically im-
possible within the framework of a Walrasian economy. This is taken as reducing
the conditions of instability:
[The] theorem . . . suggests the possibility that complementarity situ-
ations which might upset stability may be incompatible with the basic
assumptions of the competitive process. (Arrow and Hurwicz, 1958, 550)
In the same time, the gross substitutability assumption is seen as not realistic.
But gross substitutability is after all nothing more than a sufficient condition for
stability, and the field of investigation seems to be open for less stringent hypotheses,
introducing complementarity. So, during the axiomatic turn, there is a slight epis-
temological shift in stability analysis. On the one hand, there is still the Hicksian
9We know from Negishi (1958, 445, fn) that his contribution and those of Hahn (1958) and
Arrow and Hurwicz (1958) were prepared independently and submitted to Econometrica in between
Appril and July 1957.
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idea that substitutes are good for stability, but it is quite clear that substitutes, as
opposed to complementary goods, will not do all the work, and that the task will
not be so easy to achieve. The fact is that generalization of the gross substitutability
assumption (the weak gross substitutability) was not that easy to obtain. On the
other hand, it is clear also that substitutability is still regarded as the most impor-
tant concept in order to express stability conditions and to describe the structural
properties of an economy. Neither the diagonal dominance, nor the weak axiom of
revealed preferences in the aggregate caught that much interest (see below).
Through this theorem, Arrow, Block and Hurwicz were confirming the impor-
tance of GS for global stability after other results of local stability (Hahn, 1958;
Negishi, 1958). Arrow and Hurwicz (1958) had already provided a proof for this
theorem in a three-good economy. Even if GS could appear as an ad hoc assump-
tion, given its strong mathematical properties on the price path, it was regarded
however as a central assumption and a relevant and promising starting point for
further inquiries. Other aspects of the Arrow, Block and Hurwicz contribution were
regarded as strong results. Notably, the fact that the global stability was obtained
both in an economy with or without numéraire (the normalized and non-normalized
cases). Moreover, global stability implied that the price adjustment process was not
necessarily linear: any sign-preserving adjustment was accepted.
On this occasion, we see that various constraints are likely to operate on the
judgmment about the quality or the importance of a result. It turns out that
the superiority of having a theorem independent of the choice of a numéraire is
something that could appear as justified by the search for the greatest generality,
while its genuine significance from an interpretative content was not discussed or
debated.
As a consequence of this optimism and of the heuristic content of substitutability,
one can understand the situation of the work on stability at the end of the 1950s.
The idea that it would be necessary to find out stable systems with complementarity
was clearly identified. Enthoven and Arrow (1956) show that if A is stable, the DA
is stable iff the diagonal elements in D are all positive. They address the limits of
such a model:
In any actual economy, however, we must be prepared to find substantial,
asymmetrical income effects and a goodly sprinkling of gross complemen-
tarity. It is desirable, therefore, to try to find other classes of matrices
about which useful statements about stability can be made. (Enthoven
and Arrow, 1956, 453)
For all that, due to its structuring role, there is a kind of benevolence towards the
gross substitutability assumption. It is the task for unsatisfied people to prove that
gross substitutability is not appealing, and that the concept of substitutability may
not be enough to study stability. What makes the interest of this story is that
counter-examples of unstable economies will arrive a few months later.
3.2 Scarf and Gale’s counter-examples
The two important contributions of Scarf (1960) and Gale (1963) will shift the de-
bate on stability. I will not enter precisely into their construction here. Just to go
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to the point of my analysis, they construct a general equilibrium model with three
goods, based on individual rational agents, so that the tâtonnement process of the
economy does not converge to the unique equilibrium. Scarf’s example implies com-
plementarities between two goods, and asymmetrical income effects. Scarf comments
on his results, underlying that instability comes from pathological excess demand
functions. Scarf’s attitude towards this result is ambiguous. On the one hand, he
asserts that “Though it is difficult to characterise precisely those markets which are
unstable, it seems clear that instability is a relatively common phenomenon” (Scarf,
1960, 160). On the other hand, he gives some possible objections to the empirical
relevance of his model:
As a final interpretation, it might be argued that the types and diversities
of complementarities exhibited in this paper do not appear in reality, and
that only relatively similar utility functions should be postulated, and
also that some restrictions should be placed on the distribution of initial
holdings. This view may be substantiated by the known fact that if all
the individuals are identical in both their utility functions and initial
holdings, then global stability obtains. (Scarf, 1960, 160–161)
Scarf’s comment shows negatively how the language of substitutability makes
sense to interpret results, be there positive or negative ones. The presence of com-
plementarity in the system is a guarantee of descriptive relevance of the model.
And Scarf goes even farther in suggesting that complementarity may be a cause for
instability while a sufficient degree of substitutability may ensure stability.
As for Gale (1963, 8), he would insist on Giffen goods to explain the instability
examples obtained. In line with this tendency to entrust substitutability with an
explanatory power, the same kind of interpretation can be found in Negishi (1962)
and also in Quirk and Saposnik (1968, 191), who are of opinion that the stability of
a tâtonnement “is closely tied up with the absence of strongly inferior goods”.
The different reasons invoked to comment the instability examples should not be
overplayed. They stem also from the tendency to disconnect analytical cases. The
apearance of a Giffen effect is linked to situations when substitution is difficult and
is not independent with the specific situation of the some agents in terms of initial
endowments compared with other agents in the economy.
Nevertheless, the Scarf and Gale examples are received with a kind of perplexity.
Everything happens as if their models where singular models, and thus as if they
were not affecting the general idea that systems including enough substitutability
may be stable. At the same time, it is now felt urgent to find less stringent con-
ditions including complementarity, guaranteeing stability. At this moment in time,
the interpretative content of substitutability is at stake. With Scarf’s and Gale’s
examples, the situation is reversed. The suspicion is now clearly on stable systems,
and it is the task for all those who have a positive a priori in favor of stability to
produce examples of stable systems including complementarity relations. In fact,
Scarf’s results make it possible to question the heuristic content of substitutability.
Actually, by identifying many possible sources of instability, relating to the
spread of initial endowments and to the variety of preferences, and to their im-
plications on demand, the interpretative and descriptive content of substitutability
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looses some ground. It does not seem possible to express only with substitutes and
complements the characteristics of an economy, and its properties for stability. Nev-
ertheless, substitutability remains the main concept with which it is thinkable to
search for stability conditions. As a proof for this, it is remarkable that neither the
diagonal dominance hypothesis, nor the weak axiom of revealed preference would be
serious candidates for serving as a starting point to think about stability, at least in
those years.
3.3 Discussing Diagonal Dominance and WARP in the ag-
gregate
The general idea that we uphold here is of a methodological nature. Whereas some
authors would tend to apply an external set of criteria for success and failure of a
research program, we would like to focus on some complementary criteria to appraise
the history of the research done on stability. Research on stability was structured
on a set of soft constraints in terms of methods and tools to be used, which are
regarded as more fundamentally in tune with the spirit of the general equilibrium
research program. To name just a few, such soft constraints concern the choice of the
price adjustment process, the interpretative and descriptive potential of conditions
for stability, the relative importance of global vs local stability results, the search
for results that are independent of the choice of a numéraire, a tendency to prefer
models implying unicity of equilibrium. All those constraints are structuring the
expectations and valuations of the results obtained. So far, we have seen that until
the beginning of the 1970s, substitutability was able to meet a number of constraints
and to offer a good starting point for a descriptive interpretation of GET. We have
to discuss more in depth why substitutability was priviledged compared with the
assumptions of Diagonal Dominance and the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preferences
in the aggregate.
The research programme on the stability of general equilibrium is very specific
within GET, and it has consequences also on uniqueness and comparative statics
because it is disconnected from direct microfoundations of the statements. Sets
of conditions proposed as sufficient conditions for stability are related to market
properties and the study of the micreconomic foundations of those properties is
postponed. Meanwhile, stability conditions are valued according with their heuristic
content or likelihood. Actually, no alternative condition on the properties of excess
demands would appear as a promising alternative before the end of the 1950s. One
such alternatives is the Diagonal Dominance condition. It states that the terms of
the matrix JZ are such that
(DD)
zii < 0 and |zjj| >
n∑
i=1
i 6=j
|zij| j = (1, 2, ...n) (5)
This condition appeared at first in Newman (1959) but was independently ex-
plored by Arrow and Hahn10. This condition states that the effect of a price change
10"This condition apears to be new in the literature on general equilibrium, although Dr. Frank
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of good i on the excess demand for good i must be negative and greater in absolute
value than the sum of absolute values of the indirect effects of the same variation in
price of good i on the excess demands of all other goods. 11
In some sense, DD has much to be recommended. It is less stringent than
gross substitutability, because (GS) implies (DD). But practically, no utility function
has been found that may imply diagonal dominance without implying also gross
substitutability. Moreover, only certain forms of diagonal dominance do guarantee
stability. Then, it seems easier to provide less stringent conditions by taking gross
substitutability as a starting point that can be amended and weakened than by
taking diagonal dominance as a starting point. Other reasons can also explain
why DD was not taken as an interesting basis for research on stability in those
years. Actually, one can figure out the economic content of DD, expressing that the
own price effect on a market dominates the whole set of indirect effects from other
prices. On second thought, it turns out that this idea of domination involves some
quantitative property that are better avoided. At least, it is in those terms that
general equilibrium theorists conceived of the search for general theorems. In this
respect, as long as one could hope to find satisfactory results only with qualitative
assumptions, quantitative constraints, interpretable as they may, were not favored.
Moreover, it does not seem easy to use DD as a starting point to search for less
stringent assumptions. For instance, Arrow and hahn would point out that it has a
“Marshallian flavor” (Arrow and Hahn, 1971, 242) and that it does not carry with
it enough heuristic power. Such views on DD would change later on, as the set of
constraints would weaken.
What about WARP and stability? It was already known since Wald that WARP
in the aggregate was a sufficient condition for uniqueness of equilibrium. Arrow et al.
(1959) showed that WARP is a sufficient condition for local stability. Actually,
WARP is a necessary and sufficient condition for the uniqueness of equilibrium in
certain cases. GS thus implies WARP, with the advantage that the GS property
is preserved through aggregation while it is not the case for WARP (in a more
than three-good case). Actually, those relationships would not be discussed in the
1960s, hence DD appeared as the only alternative starting point for discussing about
stability, even though research on stability was somehow disconnected from the
immediate search for microfoundations of the assumptions made on the properties
of excess demand functions.
Hahn has informed me that he and Kenneth Arrow have used it in some as yet unpublished work.
It is common in the mathematical literature." (Newman, 1959, 4)
11An alternative statement for (DD), (DD’) is that the own price effect zii be greater in absolute
value to the sum of all cross price effects from the variation of the prices of other goods |zii| >
n∑
j=1
i6=j
|zij | i = 1, 2, ...n. A JZ satisfying both DD and DD’ is strongly dominant diagonal. Newman
also mentions another set of stabiity conditions based on (DD)—quasi-dominant main diagonal—
that was proposed by Hahn and Solow.
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4 The end of a research programme?
So far, I have indicated how a general framework of interpretation of the work on
stability of an exchange economy was constructed. As was seen in the first section,
the idea to search for sufficient conditions introducing complementarity pre-existed
to the Arrow Block Hurwicz result and to the Scarf and Gale counter examples.
In this section, I want to focus on two different kinds of obstacles that were put
on the road. Firstly, from an internal point of view. All the attempts that were
made to generalise the gross substitutability assumption did not give many results.
What is clear from Scarf and Gale is that it was no more possible to introduce
complementarity arbitrarily (4.1 The impossible generalisation). From an external
point of view, then, some work in the seventies and eighties questioned radically the
research programme, as it had been formulated by Walras (4.2 Through the looking-
glass, and what Sonnenschein, Mantel, Debreu, Smale and others found there).
4.1 The impossible generalization
This is an important point for my thesis. The time period following immediately
the Scarf results shows that researchers have not much hopes to obtain much better
than the Arrow et al. (1959)Arrow, Block and Hurwicz (1959) theorem. It is the
true moment when the heuristic of substitutability failed and faded away within one
decade. It is striking for instance how this set of conditions is treated in Arrow and
Hahn (1971) General competitive analysis, a book which was (and still is in many
respects) the state of the art of GET.
Actually, as we have mentionned before, the hopes to find stability results with
complementarity relations was on the agenda from 1945 on (Metzler), and it had
just been confirmed by the results on global stability. From the beginning of the
fifties on, Morishima was working on this agenda (Morishima, 1952, 1954, 1960,
1970). Morishima’s idea was to introduce complementarity relations between certain
goods. He thus proposed an economy whose excess demands would verify that goods
were grouped together so that all the substitutes of substitutes are substitutes to
each other, and so that all complementary goods of complementary goods where
complementary to each other. In the same spirit, McKenzie (1960) established
the dynamic stability of an exchange economy in which certain sums of the partial
derivatives of the excess demand with respect to the prices are positive, which allows
introducing a certain amount of complementarity into the system.12
The above discussion on the relative merits of GS, DD and WARP is thus condi-
tional on the kind of constraints that the theoretician takes as granted. This would
certainly have an impact on further research (section 4). It was already apparent
here and there in the 1950s and 1960s. For instance, McKenzie (1958) offers one of
the first study in which GS implies global stability of the unique equilibrium. when
there is no numé´raire in the model. He also provides a model with a numé´raire which
makes it possible to consider the stability of a system in which certain weighted sums
of the partial derivatives of excess demands with respect to prices are positive, a
12For any partition of the set of goods J = (1, ...n) into two subsets J1 and J2, we have∑
i∈I1 zij2 +
∑
i∈I2 zij1 > 0 for all j1 ∈ J1, j2 ∈ J2
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"natural generalization". McKenzie’s comment shows that the descriptive potential
of an assumption is linked with the choice of constraints. Indeed, the case in which
some complementarity is introduced in the model leads only to a local stability result
and aknowledges the multiplicity of equilibria, a situation which he finds descrip-
tively adequate, i.e. in accordance with his own ideas about the stylized facts: "In
this case, one must be content with a local stability theorem, but one hardly need
apologize for that. Global stability is not to be expected in general" (McKenzie,
1958, 606)
Finally, Nikaido (1964) proposed the generalised gross substitutability assump-
tion, i.e. that the sum of the symmetrical terms relative to the diagonal of the
Jacobian be positive. In such a system, if tea is a gross complement to sugar, then
sugar must be a gross substitute to tea. Some remarks on all these developments
are in order: Firstly, all the results obtained have strong limitations relatively to the
programme of general equilibrium theory. They are not independent of the choice of
the numéraire good and they are valid only locally. For example, the Morishima case
was showed to be incompatible with a Walrasian economy, because of the properties
of the numéraire commodity. That stability should be invariant under a change of
numéraire seemed "reasonable" (Newman, 1959, 4). Ohyama (1972) added a condi-
tion on the properties of substitution of the numéraire with other goods to ensure
stability. Secondly, most of the results I have mentioned suppose that they refer to
quantitative constraints on excess demand functions, in the sense that they suppose
comparing the relative strength of partial derivatives. From this point of view, the
diagonal dominance hypothesis goes in the same direction.
All these limitations illustrate the doubts that arose regarding the hopes for find-
ing a true generalisation of the gross substitutability hypothesis. Indeed, this kind
of quantitative constraint is something general equilibrium theorists would prefer to
dispense with. At least this general view was not debated. Meanwhile, the heuris-
tic of substitutability is shrinking. The question now is to discuss the relevance of
quantitative and structural restrictions on excess demand functions. The change in
the spirit and in the state of mind of the theoreticians can be clearly felt. Just to
give a quotation by Quirk (1970)Quirk (1970), who focuses specifically on the limits
of a purely qualitative approach to GET: “In contrast to the Arrow-Hurwicz results,
here we do not prove instability but instead show that stability cannot be proved
from the qualitative properties of the competitive model alone, . . . except in the
gross substitute case” (Quirk, 1970, 358). It is a very clear way to renounce estab-
lishing general properties compatible with stability. This reduces quite naturally the
analytical appeal of substitutability as a single comprehensive tool to deal with sta-
bility issues (see also Ohyama (1972, 202). Finally, at this moment on, theoreticians
have realised to what degree the gross substitutability assumption was specific, as
the only qualitative hypothesis on excess demand functions guaranteing stability of
a tâtonnement process. Of course, it may be that some mathematical economists
were perfectly aware that GS is too much an had hoc mathematical assumption to
obtain stability, but still its specificity as a qualitative assumption was much better
acknowledged by the end of the 1960s and beginning of the 1970s.
A word is in order regarding the presentation of the sufficient conditions for
stability in Arrow and Hahn (1971)’s General competitive analysis. The presentation
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of stability results in surveys such as Newman (1959) and Negishi (1962) were clearly
transmitting the view of a progressive program of research, with a need to understand
the links between different sets of conditions. Yet, Negishi introduced some more
temperate view, both enhancing the GS assumption as concentrating the essence
of the knowledge on stability and pointing out that due to unstability examples,
theoreticians would better concentrate on alternate adjustement processes (such as
non-tâtonnement processes).13 To sum up, in the beginning of the seventies, the
work on stability gives a very pessimistic, and even negative, answer to the agenda
originally formulated by Metzler and then by Arrow, Block and Hurwicz. Two
kinds of results will come and evacuate a bit more any interest with this kind of
work: the well-known Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu theorem on the one hand, and
the Smale-Saari-Simon results on the other hand.
4.2 Through the looking glass and what Sonnenschein, Man-
tel, Debreu, Smale and others found there.
Already in the thirties it was known that some properties of individual demand
behavior would not be preserved at the aggregated level in general (see for example
Schultz et al. (1938) and Hicks (1939). Clearly, there was a gap between weak
restrictions on the demand side and stringent sufficient conditions for stability. So,
while the work on stability was progressing only very slowly, and not with the results
that were expected, a group of theoreticians was engaged in taking the problem from
the other side, that is, from the hypothesis of individual maximising behaviour:
“Beyond Walras’ Identity and Continuity, that literature makes no use of
the fact that community demand is derived by summing the maximizing
actions of agents” (Sonnenschein, 1973, 353)
If it is not possible to demonstrate that an economic system with complemen-
tarity relations among markets is stable, is it not possible to show that any general
equilibrium system based on rational agents exhibits some properties regarding the
excess demand functions. This would be at least a way to "measure" the gap be-
tween what the logic of GET gives us and what we expect from it in order to arrive
at stability theorems. The answer to this question is well known. It is a series of neg-
ative results known as Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu theorems or results14. Market
excess demand generated by an arbitrary spread of preferences and initial endow-
ments will exhibit no other properties than Walras Law and the Homogeneity of
13Negishi’s reaction to Scarf examples is interesting in its way to put the emphasis on the choice
of the "computing device" and not on the interpretative content of stability conditions. This is
another instance of the fact that the proper balance between different attitudes regarding the
research program was not discussed and can only be grasped here and there from passing remarks:
"We must admit that the tâtonnement process is not perfectly reliable as a computing device
to solve the system of equations for general economic equilibrium. It is possible to interprete
these instability examples as showing that the difficulty is essentially due to the assumption of
tâtonnement (no trade out of equilibrium) and to conclude that the tâtonnement process does not
provide a correct representation of the dynamics of markets." (Negishi (1962, 658-9))
14SMD theorems are named after a series of articles published in 1972–1974.
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degree zero of excess demands relative to prices. Otherwise stated, given an arbi-
trary set of excess demands, one can always construct an economy that will produce
those excess demands. The question raised by Sonnenschein, Mantel, Debreu and
others goes against the usual stream of investigation concerning stability. But it is
the most natural stream in terms of the individualistic methodological foundations
of the general equilibrium program. Nevertheless, this result raised some perplexity
from the field of econometrics. After all, the distribution of endowments and of
preferences allowing for such arbitrary excess demand in the aggregate may well be
as much (or even more) unrealistic as the ones generating a representative agent
(Deaton, 1975). Kirman and Koch (1986) showed that the class of excess demands
would not be restrained even if the agents had the same preference relations and
co-linear endowments. To improve further on the constraints would mean to con-
struct a representative agent. So, the SMD result would imply that Giffen goods
are quite “normal” goods in a general equilibrium framework, and following Scarf
and Gale conclusions, “instability” would be a common feature of economic systems.
Then, the S-M-D theorem reduces still a bit more the relevance of quantitative re-
strictions that would yield stability. The change in the spirit of the economists has
been portrayed by Mantel:
“Another field in which new answers are obtained is that of stability of
multimarket equilibrium. It is not so long ago that the optimistic view
that the usual price adjustment process for competitive economies is,
as a rule, stable, could be found—an outstanding representative is that
of Arrow, Block, and Hurwicz (1959). Counterexamples with economies
with a single unstable equilibrium by Scarf (1960) and Gale (1963) had a
sobering effect, without destroying the impression that the competitive
pricing processes show some kind of inherent stability. Here the question
arises whether such counterexamples are likely, or whether they are just
unlikely exceptions” (Mantel et al., 1977, 112)
After the SMD results, Scarf and Gale counterexamples could no longer be re-
garded as improbable, if the excess demand should have arbitrary properties. But
from a historical point of view, one must keep in mind that there was a twelve years
gap between the reception of the SMD results and the strengthening of thsee results
by Kirman and Koch 1986. What happened during that time span is also very
fruitful for our inquiry. For all those who were discouraged by the turn of events,
for those who had only a poor faith in the possibility to find satisfactory theorems,
the Scarf counterexamples were a starting point for something else. We have seen
that Scarf himself felt uncomfortable with the instability result, and that he felt
that some disturbing cause of instability may have been arbitrarily introduced in
the model. This was the starting point for an inquiry into dynamic systems and
algorithmic computation of equilibrium (Scarf and Hansen, 1973). In this field of
research, Steve Smale endeavored to cope with the question of stability. His purely
mathematical look at the subject kept the interpretative content outside, and he
readily understood that in general equilibrium “complexity keeps us from analysing
very far ahead” (Smale, 976c, 290). Rather than concentrating his reproaches on the
descriptive content of the tâtonnement process and on the stability conditions that
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were found, Smale tackles another question, quite different from that of Sonnen-
schein, Mantel and Debreu. If equilibrium exists, how is this equilibrium reached?
After Scarf and Hansen (1973), Smale (1976) will found a dynamic process much
more complex than Walrasian tâtonnement which allows finding the equilibrium, for
any arbitrary structure of the excess demand functions. This process, the Global
Newton method, is a generalisation of a classical algorithm of computation of equi-
librium. In this process, the variations in the prices on each market dpi
dt
will not
depend solely on the sign of the excess demand zi(p) on this market, but also on the
excess demands on other markets. This dynamic process is Dz(p)dp
dt
= −λz(p)
with λ having the same sign as the determinant of the Jacobian.
Smale’s shift in the way to attack the issue of stability is of interest when con-
fronted with the constraints that general equilibrium theorists had put on the re-
search program, focusing on Walrasian tâtonnement as a neutral dynamics, whose
advantage came essentially from the mathematical simplicity in handling it.
Hahn’s (1982) reaction to this kind of process is embarrassed. Indeed, Smale’s
process is shifting the general equilibrium program. What can be the meaning of
a dynamic process in which the behaviour of the prices on each market depends of
the situation on every other market? Hahn does not have any answer to give. The
fundamental problem is that this process is very demanding in terms of information.
While the Walrasian auctioneer does not have anything else to know than excess
demands at a given price vector, the fictional auctioneer of the Global Newton
method will have to know about the qualitative properties of each excess demands.
Saari and Simon (1978) established that this amount of information was the price
to be paid to find a computational method independent of the sign of the excess
demand. This is precisely this kind of information that the use of a Walrasian
tâtonnement dynamics aimed at ignoring. With the Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu
and Kirman and Koch’s theorems on the one hand and with Smale, Saari and
Simon’s results on the other, the stability research program, in its original form, has
collapsed.
It is not the purpose of the present study to tell the details of all the escapes
from SMD (Lenfant, 2010). As far a substitutability is concerned, it is worth noting
that it appears here and there.
A first consequence of the Scarf-Smale escape from stability issues is that the
concept of substitutability becomes at best to weak to serve as a descriptive basis
of the properties of stable systems, at least as long as the search for global stability
theorems is at stake. Slowly, the condensed structure of constraints pertaining to
the research program on stability has disaggregated. For instance, the SMD results
have destroyed the perspective to search for reasonable conditions on uniqueness and
global stability. Hence, research has been reoriented towards different perspectives,
either to concentrate on the algorithm that permits to calculate equilibria (this is the
Scarf perspective) or to concentrate on local stability results in various frameworks.
It is not the purpose of this article to discuss various ways to react to SMD. Work
on the stability of a Walrasian type price adjustment process has led to some new
results regarding WARP and DD in relation to GS. To Hahn (1982) even though GS
implies DD, there is practically no example of utility functions satisfying DD but
not GS. Keenan and Kim (2013) show that DD is a sufficient condition for stability
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in an unnormalized tâtonnement process.
The effect of SMD results on the research program on stability cannot be ex-
amined independently of their broader impact on the theory of general equilibrium.
Once the perspective of obtaining uniqueness vanishes, the interest for local stability
comes back to the forefront. Once the idea of treating money as a specific input
into GET which cannot be dealt with endogeneously is well accepted, the idea of
appraising results that are not independent of the choice of the numéraire may at-
tract more attention. Whatever the global effect of SMD, it is still to be found that
some research focus on substitutability as a stabilizing phenomenon. For instance,
Keenan (2000) has established that the standard conditions for global stability of
WT (either GS, DD or that the Jacobian is Negative semidefinite) "can be trans-
lated into ones that need be imposed only on the aggregate substitution matrix"
(Keenan, 2001, 317) do depend exclusively on substitution effects:
“Thus for each condition on the matrix of total price effects implying
global stability, there is a corresponding one on only the matrix of com-
pensated price effects which also implies global stability” (Keenan, 2001,
317)
Keenan’s agenda may seem dubious, in its way to treat substitutability has a
concept which is sufficient to support all the relevant information for understanding
stability. At least, it could be taken as a remnant of the heyday of stability theory.15
To us, it is revealing of the still lively importance of the concept of substitutability
as a heuristic device for discussing stability. Following a quite different agenda,
Grandmont (1992) has established conditions on the interdependence of preferences
within the economic system (increasing heterogeneity) with the result that sufficient
heterogeneity leads to GS for a growing set of initial values of the price vector and
to WARP in the limit, thus guaranteeing stability of the WT. But a different view
could be held on the basis of a more tracatable and applied approach to GET, in line
with Scarf’s agenda, such as the one upheld by Kehoe (1992). Kehoe argues that in
production economies, the GS assumption looses much of its interest because there
are cases of multiple equilibria. He focuses on the number of equilibria rather than
on stability issues. In this framework, it is possible to construct economies with
Cobb-Douglas consumers (hence well-behaved GS behaviors) and yet a production
technology that generates several equilibria. In contrast, WARP (in the aggregate)
implies uniqueness even in production economies (Wald, 1936). Hence, in production
economies, GS does not imply WARP.
5 Final remarks
In this paper, my aim was to put to the foreground the uses of the concept of sub-
stitutability in general equilibrium theory. Substitutability, as the main concept
used to describe the qualitative properties of an economic system, was expected to
provide also good interpretative properties i.e. it was hoped that substitutability
15Note that on this occasion, Keenan favors the discussion of conditions on the Jacobian to the
use of a Lyapunov function
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would be a sufficient way to express general conditions under which the stability of
the tâtonnement would be guaranteed. I have interpreted this very general idea as
a guiding principle for the researches on stability. It was thought that substitutes
and complements should represent enough information to formulate “reasonable” or
“hardly credible” stability conditions. The point was then to see how this guiding
principle, this positive heuristic, has been affected by the mathematical results that
were foundeaton, and how it came to be deprived of its interpretative content. Of
course, I do not pretend that substitutability was the only concept implied in the
elaboration of the research programme. It is quite clear from my presentation that
the formalisation of the Walrasian tâtonnement, the reflection on quantitative con-
straints, have also played a role in this story. They formed a complex system of
rules to be followed and where themselves embedded in different representations of
the purpose of GET. The present article does not pretend to have identified the
one single way of interpreting the history of this research program and its connec-
tions with other aspects of GET. It has highlighted that within the development
of GET, it is possible to identify descriptive heuristics that seem to have payed a
role in structuring the research agenda and the interpretation of the results. But
in the final analysis, the concept of substitutability has served as a criterion in or-
der to evaluate the relevance of most of the results and to appraise the theoretical
consequences of those results on the research programme. It has been a tool for
rationalising the path followed by stability analysis. From a methodological point of
view, a conclusion that can be drawn from this study of stability is that the weak-
ening of a research program and its reformulation within the framework of a purely
mathematical theory, do not depend on a unique result, be it a negative result.
The matter depends more pragmatically on the accumulation of many negative or
weak results that come to be interpreted as a bundle of results indicating that some-
thing else must be done and that the programme must be amended. And it might
be that the Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu result was not the most important result
with regard to this amendment. In this respect, there was not any more important
result, because it was more questioning, and it makes sense to us when connected
to other results and to the general principles that dominated research on GET in
the 1960s and 1970s. This overview, it is hoped, opens more fundamentaly to a new
representation of the development of GET based on simulations. Thus, a number
of disruptive shifts from the original research program have changed the whole un-
derstanding of the tenets of GET and of the role played by different assumptions.
The evolution of the theoretical involvements of theoreticians into the concept of
substitutability offers, we think, a fruitful perspective on the transformations of a
complex and intricate research topic such as GET.
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